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Introduction
After describing the major events in the regional financial crisis, I shall link them to
structural problems in Asian finance. These structural problems arise from institutional
limitations grounded in the culture and political economy of East Asia. The “East Asian
Model” of political economy was successful in manufacturing, giving rise to triumphant
rhetoric on Asian values from Asian leaders last year. I shall attempt to identify why the
“East Asian Model” failed in finance. I conclude with a discussion of the dangers &
opportunities created by the regional financial crisis:
The Roots of the Regional Financial Crisis
The East Asian financial crisis can be traced back to the Japanese financial bubble of the
1980’s which ended with drastic falls in Japanese stocks and real estate. This rendered
effectively insolvent many Japanese companies and financial institutions. Japan never faced
up to this problem, instead hiding it by accounting gimmicks and rolling over loans. While
Japan had the financial depth to insulate its real economy from these problems, they
undermined its ability to continue financing investment in Asia.
South Korea had adopted the Japanese model of development and succeeded only too well.
With a government intent on catching up with Japanese industrialization directing bank
lending toward favoured conglomerates on the basis of their contribution to national
development, loan losses were hidden for decades in South Korea.
In South East Asia also, investment failed to meet commercial criteria, being characterized
by corruption and vanity projects flattering to the ego of national leaders. Prominent
examples were Indonesia’s attempt to design and build its own passenger aircraft and
Malaysia’s desire to have the highest building in the world. Such investment was sustained
by short-term Asian borrowing from Western banks, encouraged by low interest rates in the
West and the effective peg of local currencies to the US dollar. Finally, China’s successful
drive to industrialization and export growth, together with its 34% devaluation in 1994
undermined other Asian exports.
These problems together led to deteriorating balance of payments, most prominently in
Thailand. Western companies then began to hedge their Asian sales revenue to repatriate
profits. The requisite forward sales of Asian currencies raised local interest rates and drove
down spot rates for local currencies, leading Asian companies with unhedged US dollar
loans to stampede for US dollars to cover their positions. The high interest rates and
illiquidity punctured regional real estate bubbles and stock markets. This was exacerbated
as Asian assets were sold by Western investors who could barely distinguish Hong Kong
from New Guinea. Any mutual fund associated with Asia was sold, which forced fund
managers to dump stock in the most liquid markets — precisely the ones that were not in
trouble, namely Hong Kong and Taiwan. This abysmal geographic ignorance on the part of
Western investors, particularly in the U.S., spread the contagion to the rest of Asia.
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throughout Asia. The biggest, most worrying collapse is in Indonesia, where there has been
a 70% currency depreciation, exacerbated by self-serving policy responses by the Suharto
regime. External trade has been halted by the collapse of export credits, internal trade by
the scapegoating of Chinese merchants. Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea are now
effectively wards of the IMF which has imposed severe conditions on economic reform in
return for its short term financing.
The Regional Financial Crisis: Structural Problems
In contrast to Latin America, the macroeconomic fundamentals of most Asian economies
were sound. Savings rates were much higher than in the West and Asian governments
typically ran budget surpluses. However, in Asia, personal savings are often invested in real
estate and family companies. By contrast, the bulk of Western savings are placed in pension
funds, managed by mutual fund companies. This reflects structural barriers to the efficient
allocation of capital in Asia.
In Asia, stock markets are often an arena for speculation, rather than a market for corporate
control, as in the West. Asian bond markets account for only a small proportion of business
finance because (i) the commitment to macroeconomic austerity means that the market for
government bonds is poorly developed and cannot provide a benchmark for pricing
corporate bonds (ii) risk loving Asian investors are unimpressed by the meager, if stable
returns on bonds (iii) Asian companies are reluctant to expose their financial underwear to
the extent required by international bond markets. Consequently, in Asia, most business
finance is provided through banks, based on personal relationships.
Institutional Problems.
Underlying these structural barriers are institutional problems. In Asia, the regulators lack
independence and democratic oversight and this reduces the credibility of their bond and
stock markets. Regulatory rulings in some countries are not enforceable by the rule of law.
Accounting standards are poor. There is insufficient institutional infrastructure for
evaluating companies or diversifying portfolios. Even in Hong Kong, only 5% of the
population holds mutual funds. Consequently, a lot of capital is allocated politically:
politicians own banks and banks own politicians.
Although Asians are bigger savers than Westerners, the poorly-developed Asian bond
meant that Asians lent long to the West and borrowed short. Hence, panicked Western
financial institutions could pull the plug on Asian economies, despite the West being
dependent on Asian savings.
Eastern v Western Political Economies
Underlying the institutional problems, in turn, are the political economies of these
countries. The Western model of political economy is based on democratic government, the
rule of law and the Invisible Hand of the market. Politics and business should be kept
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fairness in business. Within companies, the ideal is objective incentive structures and
personnel procedures enforced by contract.
The East Asian model of political economy is entirely different, but has also been
successful. Governments are authoritarian, but a substitute for democratic oversight is
provided by the internalized sense of responsibility both of top leaders and of the civil
services, which are often selected by educational attainment. The substitute for the rule of
law is relationships of trust within business networks, based on family, school, dialect or
regional connections. These provide a predictable environment for business: no-one would
dare violate trust and lose their reputation within their business network because they
would then be unable to do business.
This East Asian model was successful in converting agricultural societies into
industrialized societies. Why? Because those competent, responsible authoritarians had to
compete on an international arena for export markets and international investment. That led
them to ensure sound macroeconomic fundamentals: low inflation, balance of payments
surpluses, low interest rates. High savings rates, culturally determined perhaps, provided
internal sources of capital. There was a broad commitment to basic education which
provided competent, motivated labour forces. Business skills were already there.
The “East Asian Model”: Failure in Finance
East Asia enjoyed fabulously successful economic growth over the last three decades. Last
year, this collapsed, along with Asian exchange rates, just as the rhetoric about “Asian
values” was rising to a crescendo. Why did we have such spectacular success followed by
spectacular collapse? I shall argue that both success and collapse have a common causes,
which can be understood in terms of the differing roles of competition and regulation in
manufacturing versus finance.
If you bought a car with a defective part, you would not buy that brand of car again and
would tell all your friends. Although the manufacturers of the car and of the part may have
a cosy relationship, they can't use that relationship to exploit consumers, because
consumers can quickly detect quality defects and punish them both by switching to a
different brand. Consequently, the market can be left to regulate manufactured goods,
except in special cases like drugs where the goods might have severe irreversible effects.
Contrast this with the situation facing a financial intermediary — a bank. It lends to
companies to purchase real assets. These real assets are the “inputs” of the financial
intermediary, which it uses to “produce” the liabilities — bank deposits — which it sells to
depositors. It is difficult for the buyers of the bank’s outputs (liabilities) to detect poor
quality in its “inputs” (assets) — so long as the bank can meet today's withdrawals,
depositors have no reason to think there is anything wrong with the quality of their
deposits.
The personal relationships which were so constructive in the development of East Asian
manufacturing because they substituted for a legal framework, turned out to be highly
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quality can be hidden for decades by rolling over loans to borrowers, concealing and
manipulating information. Failure of intermediaries undermines general confidence in the
quality of financial assets, making them all illiquid. This necessitates a public bailout to
prevent collapse of financial system. Thus, Government an involuntary guarantor of
intermediaries’ asset quality.
To prevent this exploitation of the public requires regulators who enforce rules on financial
disclosure, plus objective analysis of disclosed information by accountants and financial
analysts. However, East Asia lacks democratic channels to appoint, scrutinize and
discipline the regulators. Freedom of information is curtailed to maintain political stability.
The accountancy and financial analysis professions are poorly developed.
“Asian Values” and the Crash
Proponents of “Asian Values” argued that Western-style democracy was inefficient in
promoting economic development, whereas an authoritarian government could make
decisions in the national interest, overcoming the barriers to growth thrown up by interest
groups. However, authoritarian governments have unlimited reach and limited
accountability, so they are constrained only by an internalised sense of responsibility. A
good example of a responsible authoritarian is Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore who clearly
feels a personal responsibility for the fate of Singapore. This sense of responsibility can
also be seen amongst the top leaders of China, which is an important reason why China has
done so well. However, this depends on a country having to good fortune to have leaders
who happened to have internalised appropriate values from their culture. Since it is not
supported by institutions, it is vulnerable to cronyism and nepotism. The dangers are well
illustrated by Indonesia. President Suharto himself may have some feeling of responsibility
for the nation, but his family members appear to have none. And Suharto gave free rein to
his family.
The West also has authoritarians, namely regulators and judges. In recognition of
democracy's inefficiencies in processing information to arrive at decisions on complex
issues like exchange rates, interest rates or the allocation of rights to carry out economic
activity, qualified individuals are given authoritarian powers. Don Brash could change New
Zealand’s interest rates tomorrow and there's not much we can do about any particular
decision. However, he is constrained by rules which (i) require him to exercise his authority
only in pursuit of well-defined objectives, and (ii) define procedures for reviewing his
performance and re-appointment to office. He could even be taken to court if he violated
his mandate or exceeded his authority. So his authority is institutionally constrained.
Why this difference between East and West? The assumption in Asian cultures, and also on
the European Continent, is that people are fundamentally good, or at least perfectible. This
touching belief gave you Marxism, Fascism, the Killing Fields of Cambodia and other
modern disasters. By contrast, Anglo-American political economy incorporates a high level
of scepticism about people in power. Its institutions assume that people are fundamentally
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authoritarians.
This approach also has its problems, such as capture of the regulators by those who are
regulated and the manipulation of the appointment process by vested interests via campaign
contributions. However, on current evidence, the Anglo-American model of political
economy is best suited to a global economy open to international financial flows.
Dangers and Opportunities
Financial collapse in Asia has reduced income growth and demand there. There is a danger
of increased protectionism as interest groups struggle to maintain incomes, of a moratorium
on debt payments and restrictions on international capital flows. The worst-case scenario is
a wholesale rejection of the institutions which have supported the global economy.
On the plus side, the financial collapse in Asia could also lead to a demand for greater
openness, accountability and transparency to ensure continued growth. It challenges aspects
of Asian Model which had been exploited to justify government interference and cronyism.
Thus, it could point the way to a creative synthesis of Western and Asian institutions.
DEMOCRATIC  AUTHORITARIAN
SOCIALIST India, Australia, New
Zealand
China, Burma, Vietnam,
North Korea
FREE MARKET Philippines, Thailand
South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong
In deciding which outcome is more likely, consider the table below which distinguishes the
development paths of some Asia countries along just two dimensions: political and
economic organization. Few observers would have chosen the winners in the bottom left
corner of the table in the aftermath of the Second World War. After all, the most
prosperous countries in Asia were then Burma and the Philippines. However, as the
winners became clear, losers started adapting lessons from the winners.
Today, many experiments are again being run in Asia. As the results become clear the
region shall again adopt the models of political economy which are found be most
successful. The driving force shall be competition - between countries. Countries in the
region share the objective of economic growth to secure political legitimacy; to achieve
this, they must compete on international markets, not only to export, but also to attract
investment. To do that they must develop transparent, credible regulatory systems in
finance. Hong Kong and Singapore have such systems, which have stood them in good
stead through the current crisis. Other countries in the region can see and learn from that.
